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Pursuant to Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
Defendant/Appellee State of Utah petitions for rehearing, on the 
grounds that the Court has overlooked or misapprehended the law and 
facts in respect to the points set forth herein. Counsel for the 
State of Utah hereby certifies that this petition is presented in 
good faith and not for delay. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 12(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Addendum "1") 
Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Addendum "2") 
Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Administration (Addendum "3") 
REVIEW OP FACTS 
1. On June 22, 1988, Appellant filed a Complaint against the 
State of Utah and others for damages related to its property in 
Moab, Utah. (R. 1-13). 
2. On August 25, 1988, Appellee State of Utah filed a Motion 
for More Definite Statement pursuant to Rule 12 (e) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 41-43). 
3. On September 26, 1988, Judge Bunnell, District Court 
Judge, issued a "Ruling on Defendant, State of Utah's, Motion for 
More Definite Statement." (R. 52-53). Said Ruling states that 
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"The Court grants the Motion and orders that the plaintiff file an 
amendment to the pleadings . • • . fl URCP Rule 12 (e) requires that 
the amended complaint be filed within ten days or the court may 
strike the pleading or "make such order as it deems just." 
4. Said Ruling was mailed to counsel for the various parties 
on September 26, 1988, (R. 53). 
5. No Amended Complaint was filed. Apparently, by 
Appellant's own admission, an amended complaint was actually even 
prepared by Appellant's counsel, Dale F. Gardiner, on or about 
December 1, 1988, but such was never filed, and Appellee State of 
Utah was not aware that such was drafted until it was presented as 
an exhibit in the subject Motion to Dismiss proceeding in 1993. 
(R. 242-253). 
6. In December, 1988, Appellant apparently filed for 
bankruptcy. Appellant's counsel filed a Notice of Withdrawal of 
Counsel and Notice of Bankruptcy. (R. 69) . The Notice clearly 
states that Dale F. Gardiner is withdrawing as counsel and that 
"[c]ounsel for Hartford Leasing Corporation is George H. Speciale, 
Esq... ." (R. 69). 
7. No Amended Complaint was filed from the date of the 
-2-
Court's Ruling (September 26, 1988) to present. 
8. Apparently Appellant entered into a contingency fee 
agreement with Steven C. Tycksen in early 1993 (presumably then, 
before the Motion to Dismiss was filed). (See Appellantfs Brief at 
24 and R. 284-286). 
9. After four and one-half years, with no amended complaint 
filed, Appellee State of Utah, on March 26, 1993, filed a Motion to 
Dismiss for Lack of Prosecution with Prejudice or Strike and Points 
and Authorities. (R. 71-75). Said Motion indicated that URCP 
12(e) required the conforming pleading to be filed within ten (10) 
days or the court may make such order as it deems just. 
Additionally, URCP 41(b) was cited as allowing for a dismissal for 
lack of compliance with a court order. 
10. On April 7, 1993, Appellant, through attorney Steven C. 
Tycksen, filed an objection to the Motion to Dismiss as well as a 
seven-page memorandum against such dismissal. (R. 110-120). An 
affidavit was also attached to such objection. (R. 121-125). 
11. On July 15, 1993, Judge Anderson entered an Order of 
Dismissal for Lack of Prosecution with Prejudice. (R. 167-169). 
12. Appellant appealed the Judgefs Order of Dismissal. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD REHEAR THIS MATTER 
BECAUSE NO NOTICE UNDER UTAH CODE OP JUDICIAL 
ADMINISTRATION RULE 4-506(3) SHOULD HAVE BEEN REQUIRED. 
The Utah Court of Appeals in its Opinion filed December 
29, 1994, in this matter, relies heavily on the assumption that 
the negotiations over occupation of the building with Mr. Speciale 
did not indicate that Mr. Speciale was counsel for other than the 
bankruptcy. In fact, your Court at page 8, footnote 6, of the 
Opinion, states that: "Additionally, it would be curious for one 
attorney to purport to enter an appearance for another without 
making some representation of authority to do so." (Addendum "4") . 
The Court then concluded that Hartford Leasing was unrepresented by 
counsel in this matter and that a notice under Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration Rule 4-506(3) should have been sent to the 
unrepresented Hartford Leasing prior to the Motion to Dismiss 
proceeding. 
One of the main reasons, your Court should rehear this 
matter, is that George Speciale did make such representation of 
authority to the State of Utah after the notice was given of his 
being the new Hartford Leasing attorney. The following letter is 
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referenced by Hartford Leasing at R. 235: 
6/21/89 Speciale letter to Bachman concerning 
negotiations to reenter the building (Addendum "5"). 
The actual letter, a copy of which is attached hereto in Addendum 
"6", includes the following statement to the State of Utah from Mr. 
Speciale: 
My client does not wish to further litigate this 
matter since the actions of the State have already 
resulted in Hartford's seeking relief under Uie 
Bankruptcy Code. (Addendum "6") 
"This matter11 is an obvious reference to the subject 
case. The State reasonably assumed that Mr. Speciale was the legal 
advisor to Hartford Leasing in "this matter" as he purports to 
state his clients1 position in regard to the subject litigation. 
This statement by Mr. Speciale is followed up by further 
rounds of correspondence, including letters to Mr. Speciale from 
the State indicating that statements are for purposes of settlement 
only. (See letters dated June 30, 1989, December 5, 1989, and 
September 10, 1990, referenced at R. 235 with copies attached 
hereto in Addendum "7"). That statement in the letters only makes 
sense if Mr. Speciale is the counsel to Hartford Leasing in this 
litigation. Mr Speciale did not write back that he was only the 
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counsel for the bankruptcy. 
For instance, note that the September 10, 1990 letter to 
Mr. Speciale from Mr. Bachman of the Utah Attorney Generalfs Office 
refers to the "subject property of the Hartford Leasing Corporation 
lawsuit." (Addendum "7"). That letter also states "for purposes of 
settlement of this matter only"... and that a "stipulated dismissal 
with prejudice from the subject lawsuit would also be required." 
This letter is speaking to Mr. Speciale as more than just the 
bankruptcy attorney, but also as the attorney for the subject 
lawsuit. There is no response from Mr. Speciale to this letter 
indicating that he has no authority to enter into such a 
stipulation for dismissal with prejudice. 
The State of Utah reasonably believing through the 
actions or inactions of Appellant's counsel, that Appellant was 
represented in the subject litigation, did not send a notice under 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-506(3) before filing 
its Motion to Dismiss. The Motions to Dismiss by the State and one 
other Defendant, were served on Mr. Speciale. (R. 73 and 78). 
In any event, the language of Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration Rule 4-506(3) only requires that notice be provided 
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to an "unrepresented" person. Appellant admits that it had a 
contingency fee agreement with the new counsel in this matter, 
Steven Tycksen, presumably prior to the filing of Appellee's Motion 
to Dismiss on March 26, 1993 (R.285-287). This matter is raised in 
Appelleefs Brief at p. 3. Therefore, Appellant was not 
"unrepresented" at the time of the Motion to Dismiss, and there is 
not duty to serve a notice on a "represented" person. 
PREJUDICE AND INJUSTICE 
The State would be greatly prejudiced if the case were to 
move forward. How can the State have conducted proper discovery 
over the past years when the State does not yet know what the 
Complaint is, since it was required to be amended? Additionally, 
Mr. Specialefs letter indicates that Hartford Leasing is not 
interested in pursuing the litigation. It is unreasonable to 
expect the public to fund major discovery when the Complaint has 
not been amended (and therefore no complaint really exists) and the 
counsel is indicating that the client does not desire to pursue the 
litigation. 
When a District Court grants a Motion for More Definite 
Statement and the plaintiff does not file an amended complaint, and 
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over four and one-years passes since the ten (10) day deadline, 
justice is served by dismissing the matter. 
CONCLUSION 
The State of Utah had no legal obligation to send a 
notice under Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-506(3) for 
any or all of the following reasons: 
1. The notice of withdrawal of counsel indicates that 
Mr. Speciale is that new counsel for Hartford Leasing and the 
latter correspondence between the State and Mr. Speciale gave the 
State every reasonable indication that Mr. Speciale was advising 
Hartford Leasing on the litigation. Mr. Speciale represented to 
the State the position of his client in terms of this litigation. 
2. The correspondence to Mr. Speciale from the State 
indicates that it is for purposes of settlement only. 
4. Mr. Speciale was served by the State and another 
Defendant with the Motions to Dismiss. (See R. 73 and 78). 
5. In any event, by Appellantfs own admission they were 
represented by counsel at the time the Motion to Dismiss was filed. 
The notice provision of Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 
4-506(3) only applies to an "unrepresented client." (See R. 285-
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287) . 
Based on the foregoing, Appellee State of Utah 
respectfully requests that this Court grant the Petition for 
Rehearing, and affirm the order of the Seventh Judicial District 
Court which granted the Motion to Dismiss with prejudice. 
DATED this 23rd day of January, 1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
ALAN S. SACHMAN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Hailing Certificate 
I hereby certify that on the 23rd day of January, 1995, 
I caused two copies of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing to be 
mailed by United States mail, first class, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
STEVEN C. TYCKSEN 
Attorney at Law 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM 1 
Rule 12(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
439 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 12 
forming papers. The clerk or the court may waive the 
requirements of this rule for parties appearing pro se. 
For good cause shown, the court may relieve any 
party of any requirement of this rule. 
(g) Replacing lost pleadings or papers. If an 
original pleading or paper filed in any action or pro-
ceeding is lost, the court may, upon motion, with or 
without notice, authorize a copy thereof to be filed 
and used in lieu of the original. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1983; April 1, 1990.) 
Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and 
other papers; sanctions. 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party 
represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least 
one attorney of record in his individual name who is 
duly licensed to practice in the state of Utah. The 
attorney's address also shall be stated. A party who is 
not represented by an attorney shall sign his plead-
ing, motion, or other paper and state his address. Ex-
cept when otherwise specifically provided by rule or 
statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompa-
nied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the aver-
ments of an answer under oath must be overcome by 
the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sus-
tained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. 
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a 
certification by him that he has read the pleading, 
motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowl-
edge, information, and belief formed after reasonable 
inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted 
by existing law or a good faith argument for the ex-
tension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and 
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, 
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or 
needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a plead-
ing, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be 
stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omis-
sion is called to the attention of the pleader or mov-
ant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in 
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon 
its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who 
signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate 
sanction, which may include an order to pay to the 
other party or parties the amount of the reasonable 
expenses incurred because of the filing of the plead-
ing, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.) 
Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(a) When presented. A defendant shall serve his 
answer within twenty days after the service of the 
summons and complaint is complete unless otherwise 
expressly provided by statute or order of the court. A 
party served with a pleading stating a cross-claim 
against him shall serve an answer thereto within 
twenty days after the service upon him. The plaintiff 
shall serve his reply to a counterclaim in the answer 
within twenty days after service of the answer or, if a 
reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days af-
ter service of the order, unless the order otherwise 
directs. The service of a motion under this rule alters 
these periods of time as follows, unless a different 
time is fixed by order of the court: 
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones 
its disposition until the trial on the merits, the 
responsive pleading shall be served within ten 
days after notice of the court's action; 
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more defi-
nite statement, the responsive pleading shall be 
served within ten days after the service of the 
more definite statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, 
to claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall 
be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one 
is required, except that the following defenses may at 
the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack 
of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of ju-
risdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) in-
sufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of 
process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable 
party. A motion making any of these defenses shall 
be made before pleading if a further pleading i6 per-
mitted. No defense or objection is waived by being 
joined with one or more other defenses or objections 
in a responsive pleading or motion or by further 
pleading after the denial of such motion or objection. 
If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the 
adverse party is not required to serve a responsive 
pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense in 
law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion 
asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for fail-
ure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted, matters outside the pleading are pre-
sented to and not excluded by the court, the motion 
shall be treated as one for summary judgment and 
disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties 
shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all 
material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After 
the pleadings are closed but within such time as not 
to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment 
on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are pre-
sented to and not excluded by the court, the motion 
shall be treated as one for summary judgment and 
disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties 
shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all 
material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifi-
cally enumerated (l)-(7) in subdivision (b) of this 
rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and 
the motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) 
of this rule shall be heard and determined before trial 
on application of any party, unless the court orders 
that the hearings and determination thereof be de-
ferred until the trial. 
(e) Motion for more definite statement If a 
pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted 
is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reason-
ably be required to frame a responsive pleading, he 
may move for a more definite statement before inter-
posing his responsive pleading. The motion shall 
point out the defects complained of and the details 
desired. If the motion is granted and the order of the 
court is not obeyed within ten days after notice of the 
order or within such other time as the court may fix, 
the court may strike the pleading to which the motion 
was directed or make such order as it deems just. 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party 
before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive 
pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion 
made by a party within twenty days after the service 
of the pleading upon him, the court may order 
stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense 
or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scan-
dalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who 
makes a motion under this rule may join with it the 
other motions herein provided for and then available 
ADDENDUM 2 
Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
455 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 42 
but, notwithstanding the failure of a party to demand 
a jury in an action in which such a demand might 
have been made of right, the court in its discretion 
upon motion may order a trial by a jury of any or all 
issues. 
(c) Advisory jury and trial by consent In all 
actions not triable of right by a jury the court upon 
motion or of its own initiative may try any issue with 
an advisory jury or, with the consent of both parties, 
may order a trial with a jury whose verdict has the 
same effect as if trial by jury had been a matter of 
right. 
Rule 40. Assignment of cases for trial; contin-
uance. 
(a) Order and precedence. The district courts 
shall provide by rule for the placing of actions upon 
the trial calendar (1) without request ofthe parties or 
(2) upon request of a party and notice to the other 
parties or (3) in such other manner as the courts may 
deem expedient. Precedence shall be given to actions 
entitled thereto by statute. 
(b) Postponement of the trial. Upon motion of a 
party, the court may in its discretion, and upon such 
terms as may be just, including the payment of costs 
occasioned by such postponement, postpone a trial or 
proceeding upon good cause shown. If the motion is 
made upon the ground of the absence of evidence, 
such motion shall also set forth the materiality ofthe 
evidence expected to be obtained and shall show that 
due diligence has been used to procure it. The court 
may also require the party seeking the continuance 
to state, upon affidavit or under oath, the evidence he 
expects to obtain, and if the adverse party thereupon 
admits that such evidence would be given, and that it 
may be considered as actually given on the trial, or 
offered and excluded as improper, the trial shall not 
be postponed upon that ground. 
(c) Taking testimony of witnesses present If re-
quired by the adverse party, the court shall, as a con-
dition to such postponement, proceed to have the tes-
timony of any witness present taken, in the same 
manner as if at the trial; and the testimony so taken 
may be read on the trial with the same effect, and 
subject to the same objections that may be made with 
respect to a deposition under the provisions of Rule 
32(c)(1) and (2) [Rule 32(c)(3)(A) and (B)]. 
Rule 41. Dismissal of actions. 
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof. 
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. Subject to 
the provisions of Rule 23(c), of Rule 66, and of 
any applicable statute, an action may be dis-
missed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) 
by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before 
service by the adverse party of an answer or of a 
motion for summary judgment, or (ii) by filing a 
stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who 
have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise 
stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, 
the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a 
notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication 
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has 
once dismissed in any court of the United States 
or of any state an action based on or including 
the same claim. 
(2) By order of court Except as provided in 
Paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an 
action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs 
instance save upon order of the court and upon 
such terms and conditions as the court deems 
-proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a 
defendant prior to the service upon him of the 
plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not 
be dismissed against the defendant's objection 
unless the counterclaim can remain pending for 
independent adjudication by the court. Unless 
otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal un-
der this paragraph is without prejudice. 
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For 
failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with 
these rules or any order of court, a defendant may 
move for dismissal of an action or of any claim 
against him. After the plaintiff, in an action tried by 
the court without a jury, has completed the presenta-
tion of his evidence the defendant, without waiving 
his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is 
not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground 
that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has 
shown no right to relief. The court as trier of the facts 
may then determine them and render judgment 
against the plaintiff or may decline to render any 
judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the 
court renders judgment on the merits against the 
plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in 
Rule 52(a). Unless the court in its order for dismissal 
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivi-
sion and any dismissal not provided for in thi6 rule, 
other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for 
improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, 
operates as an adjudication upon the merits. 
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or 
third-party claim. The provisions of this rule apply 
to the dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim, or 
third-party claim. A voluntary dismissal by the 
claimant alone pursuant to Paragraph (1) of Subdivi-
sion (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive 
pleading is served or, if there is none, before the in-
troduction of evidence at the trial or hearing. 
(d) Costs of previously-dismissed action. If a 
plaintiff who has once dismissed an action in any 
court commences an action based upon or including 
the same claim against the same defendant, the court 
may make such order for the payment of costs of the 
action previously dismissed as it may deem proper 
and may stay the proceedings in the action until the 
plaintiff has complied with the order. 
(e) Bond or undertaking to be delivered to ad-
verse party. Should a party dismiss his complaint, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, pur-
suant to Subdivision (a)(l)(i) above, after a provi-
sional remedy has been allowed such party, the bond 
or undertaking filed in support of such provisional 
remedy must thereupon be delivered by the court to 
the adverse party against whom such provisional 
remedy was obtained. 
Rule 42. Consolidation; separate trials. 
(a) Consolidation. When actions involving a com-
mon question of law or fact are pending before the 
court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or 
all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all 
the actions consolidated; and it may make such or-
ders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to 
avoid unnecessary costs or delay. 
(b) Separate trials. The court in furtherance of 
convenience or to avoid prejudice may order a sepa-
rate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or 
third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of any 
number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-
party claims, or issues. 
ADDENDUM 3 
Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
Rule 4-408 CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 730 
restrictions, limitations or requirements as the 
regulating authority deems appropriate; to sus-
pend the surety's qualification pending compli-
ance with specified provisions of this rule; or to 
disqualify the surety. The decision shall be based 
on the facts appearing in the file maintained by 
the regulating authority and the facts presented 
in evidence at the hearing. The decision shall 
include the reasons therefor, notice of any right 
of review, and the time limit for filing for such a 
review. The decision shall be served upon the 
surety by mailing the same, via first class mail, 
to the surety's last known address on file with 
the regulating authority. 
(H) Any party aggrieved by the decision of the 
regulating authority may file a petition for judi-
cial review within thirty days after the date of 
the decision. Judicial review shall be governed by 
the procedures set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-15. 
(Amended effective January 15,1990; April 15,1991; 
January 1, 1992; February 1, 1993.) 
Rule 4-408. Locations of trial courts of record. 
Intent* 
To designate locations of trial courts of record. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all trial courts of record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Each county seat and the following municipali-
ties are hereby designated as locations of trial courts 
of record: American Fork; Bountiful; Cedar City; 
Clearfield; Kaysville; Layton; Murray; Orem; Park 
City; Roosevelt; Roy; Salem; Sandy; Spanish Fork; 
West Valley City. 
(2) Subject to limitations imposed by law, a trial 
court of record of any subject matter jurisdiction may 
hold court in any location designated by this rule. 
(Added effective January 1, 1992.) 
ARTICLE 5. 
CIVIL PRACTICE. 
Rule 4-501. Motions. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, 
supporting memoranda and documents with the 
court. 
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting 
and scheduling hearings on dispositive motions. 
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all dis-
trict and circuit courts except proceedings before the 
court commissioners and the small claims depart-
ment of the circuit court. This rule does not apply to 
petitions for habeas corpus or other forms of extraor-
dinary relief. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Filing and service of motions and memo-
randa. 
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. All 
motions, except uncontested or ex-parte matters, 
shall be accompanied by a memorandum of 
points and authorities appropriate affidavits, and 
copies of or citations by page number to relevant 
portions of depositions, exhibits or other docu-
ments relied upon in support of the motion. Mem-
oranda supporting or opposing a motion shall not 
exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the 
"statement of material facts" as provided in para-
graph (2), except as waived by order of the court 
on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte applies-
tion is made to file an over-length memorandum, 
the application shall state the length of the prin-
cipal memorandum, and if the memorandum is in 
excess of ten pages, the application shall include 
a summary of the memorandum, not to exceed 
five pages. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. 
The responding party shall file and serve upon 
all parties within ten days after service of a mo-
tion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion, 
and all supporting documentation. If the re-
sponding party fails to file a memorandum in op-
position to the motion within ten days after ser-
vice of the motion, the moving party may notify 
the clerk to submit the matter to the court for 
decision as provided in paragraph (l)(d) of this 
rule. 
(c) Reply memorandum. The moving party 
may serve and file a reply memorandum within 
five days after service of the responding party's 
memorandum. 
(d) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the 
expiration of the five-day period to file a reply 
memorandum, either party may notify the Clerk 
to submit the matter to the court for decision. 
The notification shall be in the form of a separate 
written pleading and captioned "Notice to Sub-
mit for Decision." The notification shall contain a 
certificate of mailing to all parties. If neither 
party files a notice, the motion will not be sub-
mitted for decision. 
(2) Motions for summary judgment 
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion. 
The points and authorities in support of a motion 
for summary judgment shall begin with a section 
that contains a concise statement of material 
facts as to which movant contends no genuine 
issue exists. The facts shall be stated in separate 
numbered sentences and shall specifically refer 
to those portions of the record upon which the 
movant relies. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a mo-
tion. The points and authonties in opposition to 
a motion for summary judgment shall begin with 
a section that contains a concise statement of ma-
terial facts as to which the party contends a gen-
uine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be 
stated in separate numbered sentences and shall 
specifically refer to those portions of the record 
upon which the opposing party relies, and, if ap-
plicable, shall state the numbered sentence or 
sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed. 
All material facts set forth in the movant's state-
ment and properly supported by an accurate ref-
erence to the record shall be deemed admitted for 
the purpose of summary judgment unless specifi-
cally controverted by the opposing party's state-
ment. 
(3) Hearings. 
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered 
without a hearing unless ordered by the Court, or 
requested by the parties as provided in para-
graphs (3Kb) or (4) below. 
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(b) In cases where the granting of a motion 
would dispose of the action or any issues in the 
action on the merits with prejudice, either party 
at the time of filing the principal memorandum 
in support of or in opposition to a motion may file 
a written request for a hearing. 
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the 
court finds that (a) the motion or opposition to 
the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive 
issue or set of issues governing the granting or 
denial of the motion has been authoritatively de-
cided. 
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the 
court shall notify the requesting party. When a 
request for hearing is granted, the court shall set 
the matter for hearing or notify the requesting 
party that the matter shall be heard and the re-
questing party shall schedule the matter for 
hearing and notify all parties of the date and 
time. 
(e) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a 
courtesy copy of the motion, memorandum of 
points and authorities and all documents sup-
porting or opposing the motion shall be delivered 
to the judge hearing the matter at least two 
working days before the date set for hearing. 
Copies shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies 
and indicate the date and time of the hearing. 
Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk 
of the court. 
(f) If no written request for a hearing is made 
at the time the parties file their principal memo-
randa, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed 
waived. 
(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at 
least thirty (30) days before the scheduled trial 
date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after 
that date without leave of the Court. 
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and no-
tice and for good cause shown, the court may grant a 
request for an expedited disposition in any case 
where time is of the essence and compliance with the 
provisions of this rule would be impracticable or 
where the motion does not raise significant legal is-
sues and could be resolved summarily. 
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own 
motion or at a party's request may direct arguments 
of any motion by telephone conference without court 
appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all 
telephone arguments and the rulings thereon if re-
quested by counsel. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 
1991.) 
Rule 4-502. Discovery procedures in civil cases. 
Intent: 
To establish a procedure for the filing of discovery 
documents. 
To establish a limitation on discovery procedures 
within 30 days of trial. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the District, Juvenile and 
Circuit Courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Parties conducting discovery under Rules 33, 
34 and 36 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure shall 
not file discovery requests with the clerk of the court, 
but shall file only the original certificate of service 
stating that the discovery requests have been served 
on the other parties and the date of service. The re-
sponding party shall file a similar certificate with the 
clerk of the court. 
(2) The party serving the discovery request shall 
retain the original with a copy of the proof of service 
affixed to it and serve a copy of the discovery request 
and proof of service upon the opposing party or coun-
sel. The party responding to the discovery request 
shall retain t i e original with a copy of the proof of 
service affixed to it, and serve a copy of the responses 
and the proof of service upon the opposing party or 
counsel. The discovery requests and response shall 
not be filed with the clerk of the court unless the 
court on motion and notice and for good cause shown 
so orders. 
(3) Any party filing a motion to compel compliance 
with a discovery request or a motion which relies 
upon the discovery response shall attach a copy of the 
discovery request or response which is at issue in the 
motion. 
(4) Depositions taken pursuant to the Rules of 
Civil Procedure shall not be filed with the clerk of the 
court except as provided in this Code or upon order of 
the court for good cause shown. 
(5) All parties shall be entitled to conduct discov-
ery proceedings in accordance with this rule. All dis-
covery proceedings shall be completed, including all 
responses thereto, and all depositions and other docu-
ments filed with the court no later than thirty (30) 
days before the date set for trial of the case. The right 
to conduct discovery proceedings within thirty (30) 
days before trial shall be within the discretion of the 
court. Motions to conduct discovery within thirty (30) 
days before trial shall be presented to the judge as-
signed to the case upon notice to the other parties in 
the action. In exercising its discretion, the court shall 
take into consideration the necessity and reasons for 
such discovery, the diligence or lack of diligence of 
the parties seeking such discovery, Whether permit-
ting such discovery will prevent the case from going 
to trial on the scheduled date, or result in prejudice to 
any party. Nothing herein shall preclude or limit the 
voluntary exchange of information or discovery by 
stipulation of the parties at any time prior to the date 
set for trial, but in no event shall such exchanges or 
stipulations require a court to grant a continuance of 
the trial date. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 
1991.) 
Rule 4-503. Requests for jury instructions. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting 
and requesting jury instructions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the District, Circuit and 
Justice Courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) All jury instruction requests shall be presented 
to the court five days prior to the scheduled trial date 
unless otherwise ordered by the court. The court, in 
its discretion, may allow the presentation of jury in-
structions at any time prior to the submission of the 
case to the jury. At the time of presentation to the 
court, a copy of the requested instructions shall be 
furnished to opposing counsel. 
(2) Jury instruction requests must be in writing 
and state in full the instruction requested. Each re-
quest shall be upon a separate sheet of paper, the 
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ORHE, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Plaintiff Hartford Leasing Corporation appeals the trial 
court's decision to grant, with prejudice, defendant State of 
Utah's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute. We reverse 
and remand. 
FACTS 
Events leading up to the legal dispute at issue here are of 
little relevance to our decision, and thus ve focus on the 
procedural facts. The State of Utah leased office space in a 
building located in Moab, Utah, owned by Hartford Leasing. On 
June 22, 1988, Hartford filed a complaint against the State, 
alleging breach of the lease agreement after the State quit the 
premises and ceased paying rent.1 The State filed a Motion for 
1. Three original defendants in this complaint, Rio Vista Oil 
Limited, LaSal Oil Company, and Dependable Janitorial Service, 
are not parties to this appeal, having been previously dismissed 
tram Vhm aefcion. 
More Definite Statement on August 25, 1988, pursuant to Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(e)• The trial court granted the motion on 
September 28, 1988, and called for an amended complaint. 
Hartford did not file an amended complaint, although one was 
prepared by its attorney, Dale Gardiner. 
Hartford filed for bankruptcy on December 1, 1988. On 
December 30, 1988, Gardiner filed a Notice of Withdrawal of 
Counsel and Notice of Bankruptcy, which was duly served on the 
State. Both notices were combined in a single document, which 
read as follows: 
Dale F« Gardiner, attorney at law, 
withdraws as counsel for the plaintiff in the 
above entitled action* 
NOTICE is also given that on December 1, 
1988, Hartford Leasing Corporation filed a 
chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in the United 
States Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
Utah. Counsel for Hartford Leasing 
Corporation is George H. Speciale, Esq., 5 
Triad Center #585, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84180. 
Hartford's bankruptcy case was concluded on October 29, 1990. 
After Gardiner's notice, no further documents were'tailed in 
the instant action until March 26, 1993, when the State filed a 
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Prosecution. In support of its 
motion, the State contended that Hartford failed to take any 
action in the case over a four~and-one-half year period and had 
not filed an amended complaint, in response to the Motion for 
More Definite Statement, within the ten-day period required by 
Rule 12(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure• However, the 
State had not, at any time after receiving word of Gardiner's 
withdrawal, notified Hartford, in accordance with Rule 4*506(3) 
of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, that it must retain 
new counsel* By the terms of Rule 4*506(3), such notice must be 
given "before opposing counsel can initiate further proceedings.w 
On April 12, 1993, in response to the State's motion to 
dismiss, Hartford#s new attorney, Steven Tycksen, filed a Notice 
of Appearance of Counsel, a Request for Scheduling, and 
Objections to Defendant's Motion for Dismissal, which also 
included a request for oral argument. On June 8, 1993, Hartford 
filed a Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss and a Notice to Submit for Decision, which 
stated that "Plaintiff's Objection to Defendant's Motion for 
Dismissal • . • is now at issue and ready for decision of the 
Court." 
The trial court made three rulings related to the State's 
Motion to Dismiss. First, in its ruling issued June 21, 1993, 
the court granted the State's motion, finding that Hartford 
failed to move the case forward during the four-and-one-half year 
period since its initial filing. The court noted the State's 
failure to notify Hartford concerning the appointment of new 
counsel, but stated that this failure was remedied by giving 
Hartford adequate time to obtain new counsel and respond to the 
motion. Additionally, the court refused to accept Hartford's 
supplemental memorandum and thus did not consider the information 
contained therein. 
Second, after receiving no objections to this decision, the 
trial court issued an Order of Dismissal for Lack of Prosecution 
with Prejudice on July 15. However, Hartford had submitted an 
objection to the June 21 ruling via facsimile, which was 
transmitted between 4:58 p.m. and 5:10 p.m. on July 15, but the 
order had already been filed when the transmission was received. 
In its objection, Hartford contended that the court should not 
have made its decision without hearing oral arguments, that 
dismissal with prejudice was inappropriate, that the court erred 
in considering the motion absent the State's compliance with Rule 
4-506, and that the court erred in refusing to consider its 
supplemental memorandum. 
Finally, on July 19, the court ruled on Hartford's 
objections by affirming its order to dismiss. It state,d that 
Hartford's Notice to Submit for Decision waived its original 
request for oral argument and that supplemental memoranda are not 
permitted by Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration so that the court could not consider the 
additional information contained therein. 
Hartford appeals. 
ISSUES 
Although Hartford raises a number of issues, the thrust of 
Hartford's appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion 
by dismissing, for failure to prosecute, Hartford's complaint. 
We therefore consider only the following two issues: (1) whether 
the court abused its discretion in granting the State's Notion to 
Dismiss when the State had failed to first comply with the 
requirements of Rule 4-506(3) of the Code of Judicial 
Administration and (2) whether the court erred in its 
interpretation of Rule 4-501 when it refused to accept Hartford's 
supplemental memorandum. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing a trial court's decision to dismiss for failure 
to prosecute, we accord the trial court broad discretion and do 
not disturb its decision absent an abuse of discretion and a 
likelihood that an injustice has occurred• Charlie Brown Constr. 
Co, v. Leisure Sports, Inc.. 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah App.), 
cert, deniedr 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). In determining whether 
the court abused its discretion, we "balance the need to expedite 
litigation and efficiently utilize judicial resources with the 
need to allow parties to have their day in court.11 Meadow Fresh 
Farms. Inc. v. Utah state Univ.. 813 P.2d 1216, 1219 (Utah App. 
1991). Of course, the goal of affording parties "an opportunity 
to be heard11 is the essential purpose of the court system, and 
thus our system values this goal over that of judicial economy. 
Westinahouse Elec Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc.. 
544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975). 
A trial court's interpretation of a rule in the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration presents a question of law reviewed for 
correctness. Wells v. Wells. 871 P.2d 1036, 1038 (Utah App. 
1994). 
DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE 
In our consideration of a trial court's dismissal for 
failure to prosecute, we look to factors besides the mere elapse 
of time since the case was filed. Both the Utah Supreme Court 
and this court have considered, where appropriate, at least five 
additional factors: (1) Mthe conduct of both parties"; (2) the 
opportunity available to each party to move the case forward; (3) 
what each party has accomplished in moving the case forward;2 (4) 
the difficulty or prejudice imposed on the opposing party by 
reason of the delay; and (5) "most important, whether injustice 
may result from the dismissal." Westinahouse Elec. Supply CO. V. 
Paul W. Larsen Contractor. Inc.. 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975). 
Accord Country Meadows Convalescent Ctr. v. Department of Health. 
851 P.2d 1212, 1215 (Utah App. 1993). See K.L.C. Inc. v. McLean. 
2. We pause to note the obvious: What each party has done to 
move the case forward can only be evaluated in light of each 
party's responsibility concerning the case. Of course, the 
plaintiff, as the party initiating the lawsuit, has the primary 
responsibility to move the case forward. The defendant's 
responsibility is limited to responding timely to the action, 
expeditiously attending to discovery, and moving any counterclaim 
along. The defendant has no general responsibility to move 
plaintiff's action to judgment. 
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656 P.2d 986, 988 (Utah 1982); Utah Oil Co, v. Harris. 565 P.2d 
1135, 1137 (Utah 1977); Meadow Fresh Farms. Inc. v. Utah State 
Univ.. 813 P.2d 1216, 1219 (Utah App. 1991). Application of 
these factors, to which we now turn, requires consideration of 
the ••*totality of the circumstances'11 in order to determine 
,f
*[w]hether delay is a ground for the dismissal of an action. ',|3 
Country Meadows. 851 P.2d at 1215 (quoting Department of Social 
Servs. v. Romero. 609 P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah 1980)). 
A. Conduct, Opportunity and Accomplishments of Parties 
1. Effect of Bankruptcy Petition 
Each party seeks refuge behind the pendency of the related 
bankruptcy proceeding: Hartford points to it as explanation for 
why it did nothing in the instant case for at least two years out 
of the more than four-year period of inactivity; the State 
suggests the bankruptcy filing precluded it from giving Hartford 
notice to appoint counsel. 
The Bankruptcy Code does not offer complete shelter to 
either party as a means to escape their respective 
responsibilities in moving this case forward. See Maxfield v. 
Rushton, 779 P.2d 237, 241-42 (Utah App.) (Orme, J., concurring), 
cert, denied. 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1989). Even assuming the State 
was prevented from filing the notice to appoint counsel by the 
automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988), a 
proposition which is questionable in any event,4 this would not 
3. We note that in the course of our review, we do not consider 
the evidence contained in the supplemental memorandum. We are 
limited to the evidence properly before the trial court. Adamson 
v. Brockbank. 112 Utah 52, 78, 185 P.2d 264, 277 (1947); 
Territorial Sav. & Loan Ass#n v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah 
App. 1989). In the instant case, the information contained in 
the supplemental memorandum was not before the trial court. In 
two separate rulings, issued on June 21 and July 19, the trial 
court stated that the supplemental memorandum was not permitted, 
and that it refused to consider the information contained 
therein. As hereinafter explained, the trial court's ruling in 
this respect was correct. 
4. So far as judicial proceedings are concerned, section 362 
refers only to proceedings "against the debtor.M 11 U.S.C. 
§ 362(a)(1) (1988). £ee, ?,qt, Ejelge-m v. Price, 17 F.3d 1276, 
1277 n.2 (10th Cir. 1994); Victor Foods. Inc. v. Crossroads 
Economic Dev.. Inc.. 977 F.2d 1224, 1226-27 (8th Cir. 1992) (per 
curiam) (debtor's bankruptcy did not toll statute of limitations 
(continued...) 
explain why the notice was not given during the two-and-one-half 
year period following termination of the bankruptcy case. 
While Hartford's bankruptcy posture imposed financial 
hardship and procedural complexities that offer some rationale 
for its failure to move the case forward, its hands were not 
completely tied. As a bankruptcy debtor, it could have pursued 
this case either as a Chapter 11 debtor in possession or through 
a trustee,5 particularly where, as here, an outcome in its favor 
would have added assets to the banJcruptcy estate. The bankruptcy 
trustee may hire, with court approval and ••for a specified 
special purpose,11 an attorney to represent the bankrupt debtor in 
matters "in the best interest of the estate91 but unrelated to the 
trustee's duties in estate administration. 11 U.S.C. § 327(e) 
(1988). See Conticommoditv Servs.. Inc. v. Raaan, 826 F.2d 600, 
602 (7th Cir. 1987) (in litigation commenced pre-bankruptcy, 
trustee became real party in interest and retention of counsel by 
trustee was within exclusive jurisdiction of bankruptcy court). 
Therefore, pendency of the bankruptcy case does not 
completely excuse Hartford from taking action, nor does it excuse 
the State's failure to give the required notice to appoint 
counsel, at least for the period following the conclusion of the 
bankruptcy case. 
4. (...continued) 
because automatic stay applies to actions filed against debtor, 
not by debtor); Martin-Triaona v. Champion Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n, 892 F.2d 575, 577 (7th Cir. 1989) (defendant able to 
initiate a motion to dismiss complaint brought by bankrupt 
plaintiff, notwithstanding automatic stay, because stay does not 
apply to actions brought by debtor); Carlev Capital Group v. 
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.. 889 F.2d 1126, 1127 (D.C Cir. 1989) 
(per curiam) (automatic stay inapplicable to actions brought by 
debtor that would benefit bankruptcy estate); Rhett White Motor 
Sales Co. v. Wells Farao Bank. 99 B.R. 12, 15 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 
1989) ("[SJtay provisions are not designed to stay actions which 
have been commenced by the bankrupt party.11). 
5. Under Chapter 11, a trustee is appointed "for cause" or "in 
the interests of creditors," 11 U.S.C. S 1104(a) (1988); 
otherwise, the debtor continues in possession. If there was no 
reason to appoint a trustee in Hartford's case, Hartford was a 
debtor in possession and was entitled, with limited exceptions 
not pertinent here, to all the powers with which trustees are 
invested. £££ 11 U.S.C. S 1107(a) (1988). 
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2. Rule 4-506 
The State's failure to comply with the notice requirements 
regarding legal counsel, unambiguously imposed by the Utah Code 
of Judicial Administration, is at the heart of our analysis of 
the State's responsibility, conduct, and opportunity to move this 
case forward. We recognize that Hartford, as plaintiff, bears 
the initial burden of prosecuting its claim diligently. Meadow 
Fresh Farms. Inc. v. Utah State Univ., 813 P.2d 1216, 1218 (Utah 
App. 1991). The State's responsibility, as a defendant which has 
not asserted a claim for affirmative relief, is limited. See 
suora note 2. However, the requirement of Rule 4-506 presents 
precisely the type of requirement with which the State must 
comply in discharge of its responsibility as a defendant. The 
pertinent provisions of the rule state: 
When an attorney . . . withdraws from the 
case or ceases to act as an attorney, 
opposing counsel must notify, in writing, the 
unrepresented client of his/her 
responsibility to retain another attorney or 
appear in person before opposing counsel can 
initiate further proceedings against the 
client. A copy of the written notice shall 
be filed with the court and no further 
proceedings shall be held in the matter until 
20 davs have elapsed from the date of filing.. 
Utah Code Jud. Admin. R4-506(3) (emphasis added). Given a plain 
reading of Rule 4-506, the State was precluded from filing its 
motion to dismiss without first giving the required notice. 
Nonetheless, it failed to give that notice before filing its 
motion to dismiss. 
We are unpersuaded by the State's contention that it took 
Gardiner's notice to mean that Speciale had entered his 
appearance as counsel for Hartford in place of Gardiner, and thus 
no notice to appoint counsel was necessary. Examination of 
Gardiner's withdrawal of counsel and bankruptcy notice shows that 
its terms, when taken in context, are not ambiguous and indicate 
Speciale was Hartford's bankruptcy attorney and not Hartford's 
attorney in the instant action. Hention of Speciale's 
representation is in the same paragraph as the notice of 
bankruptcy and not part of the withdrawal of counsel paragraph 
that preceded it. The trial court correctly observed that the 
lack of an express notice of appearance should have indicated to 
the State that Hartford was without counsel in the instant action 
upon Gardiner's withdrawal/ 
The trial court found that "[g]iven the ambiguity [sic] in 
the notice of withdrawal and the absence of a notice of 
appearance by other counsel, the [State] should have given a 
notice under Rule 4-506." However, the trial court erred when it 
went on to excuse the State's failure to send Hartford the 
required notice. The court determined that ••the remedy for such 
a failure is not necessarily denial of the motion. The remedy is 
to grant Hartford sufficient time after a pleading is filed in 
violation of Rule 4-506 to obtain counsel and adequately respond. 
It is evident that Hartford has had that opportunity." The 
rule's provisions, however, offer no room for such discretion to 
excuse compliance: "opposing counsel must notify . . . before 
opposing counsel can initiate further proceedings.11 Utah Code 
Jud. Admin. R4-506(3) (emphasis added). 
In addition, the trial court failed to consider the 
particular importance of giving the required notice to Hartford, 
a corporation, prior to the State's filing of its motion. Unlike 
the individual litigant who may, by the terms of Rule 4-506, 
either appoint new counsel or proceed pro se, Hartford's status 
as a corporation precludes self-representation because 
corporations are artificial entities that are not allowed to 
represent themselves in court. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-40 
(1992) ; Tracv-Burke Assocs. v. Department of Employment Sec.. 699 
P.2d 687, 688 (Utah 1985) (per curiam); Tuttle v. Hi-Land 
Dairyman's Ass'n, 10 Utah 2d 195, 350 P.2d 616, 618 (Utah 1960). 
Until the required notice was given, Hartford could afford to be 
somewhat complacent, knowing that the State could do nothing 
until it had first given Hartford the required notice to appoint 
6. The State's contention that Speciale appeared to have 
replaced Gardiner as counsel for Hartford is untenable for other 
reasons. Negotiations over occupation of the building between 
Speciale and the State's counsel are not, as suggested by the 
State, evidence that Speciale was counsel for Hartford in this 
action. The building was the primary asset of the bankruptcy 
estate, and there was no reason to assume Speciale was conducting 
anything but bankruptcy business on behalf of the estate. 
Additionally, it would be curious for one attorney to purport to 
enter an appearance for another without making some 
representation of authority to do so. 
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new counsel. Until such notice was given, it was as though the 
State acquiesced in Hartford's failure to move the action along.7 
B. Prejudice 
In its ruling on the motion to dismiss, the trial court 
indicated that it ^discounts some of those claims [of prejudice] 
because most of the defendants have had the opportunity and the 
incentive to gather much of the same evidence in related 
matters." We agree with the court's analysis of this factor, and 
thus will not belabor it. 
C. Injustice 
We now consider whether Hartford would suffer injustice by 
not having its day in court, giving due regard to the State's 
failure to give the notice required by Rule 4-506. "Dismissal 
with prejudice . . . is a harsh and permanent remedy when it 
precludes a presentation of a plaintiff's claims on their 
7. We also wish to note that the effect of the State's failure 
to give the required notice to appoint counsel does not, as 
Hartford suggests, deprive the trial court of jurisdiction. 
Courts lack actual jurisdiction by reason of defects in notice 
only in limited circumstances. See, e.g.. Garcia v. Garcia. 712 
P.2d 288, 290 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (court lacks personal 
jurisdiction if service of process requirements under Rule 4 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure not met); Lamarr v. State Deo't 
of Transp.. 828 P.2d 535, 542 (Utah App. 1992) (compliance with 
notice provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1993) required to 
confer subject matter jurisdiction over claim against state 
agency). In contrast, failure to adhere to more routine notice 
requirements does not deprive the court of jurisdiction. See, 
e.g.. Sovereen v. Meadows, 595 P.2d 852, 854 n.3 (Utah 1979) 
(defective notice to quit in an unlawful detainer action results 
in failure to state a claim, but not lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction); In re Clinton. 762 P.2d 1381, 1386-87 (Colo. 1988) 
(failure to comply with statutory requirement for appointment of 
counsel in mental health proceedings does not affect personal 
jurisdiction). Once a court properly acquires jurisdiction, it 
is not lost through subsequent procedural events. Secrest v. 
Simonet. 708 P.2d 803, 807 (Colo. 1985); State ex rel. Owens v. 
Hodaer 641 P.2d 399, 405-06 (Kan. 1982). In the instant case, 
the action had been filed, the defendants served, and the trial 
court already had both subject matter and personal jurisdiction. 
The State's failure to send notice to appoint counsel under Rule 
4-506 does not destroy the court's jurisdiction—it merely 
precludes the State from doing anything in the case until the 
requirement has been met. 
merits.w Bonneville Tower Condominium Mat, Corom. v. Thompson 
Michie Assocs.. Inc.. 728 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1986). See 
Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters. 
Inc.. 16 Utah 2d 211, 216, 398 P.2d 685, 688 (1965) (pretrial 
dismissal is Ma drastic action . . . used sparingly and with 
great caution11). While Hartford has hardly been blameless over 
the period of more than four years since it filed its complaint, 
the state's failure to give notice to appoint counsel before 
filing its motion weighs heavily—indeed, conclusively—in 
Hartford's favor. Proper notice to appoint new counsel under 
Rule 4-506 is critically important, and would have let Hartford 
know that the State was tired of waiting and intended to take 
further action on the claim against it. Such notice would likely 
have spurred Hartford to action, as demonstrated by the plethora 
of legal documents filed by Tycksen concurrent with his Notice of 
Appearance and in, response to the State's Motion to Dismiss.8 It 
would indeed be unjust to deprive Hartford of its day in court 
given the State's failure to provide the required notice. 
D. Summary 
The State's failure to give notice to appoint counsel prior 
to filing its motion to dismiss, coupled with the other factors 
discussed above, rendered it improper for the trial court to 
dismiss Hartford's action, notwithstanding the inordinate period 
of inactivity that preceded the State's motion. 
SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY MEMORANDUM 
Hartford contends that the plain language of Rule 4-501 of 
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration allows supplemental 
memoranda to be submitted to the trial court, and the court erred 
in not accepting its second memorandum. Although we need not 
reach this issue given our above disposition, the question is 
apparently one of some controversy among the bar, has been ably 
briefed by counsel, and is not the kind of issue that often 
8. Hartford responded to the Motion to Dismiss two weeks after 
it was filed. Had the State first filed a notice to appoint 
counsel, Hartford would obviously have had an opportunity to 
reactivate its claim before the elapse of the 20-day period 
prescribed by Rule 4-506(3), rendering any intended motion to 
dismiss for failure to prosecute of academic interest only. ££. 
Johnson v. Firebrand, Inc. 571 P.2d 1368, 1369-70 (Utah 1977) 
(finding court had abused its discretion in dismissing case for 
failure to prosecute when party's motion to dismiss filed 
concurrently with its answer)• 
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arises on appeal. Thus, we offer our opinion for what it may be 
worth. 
We disagree with Hartford and see no error in the court's 
handling of this question. Rule 4-501 states, in part, as 
follows: 
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. 
All motions, except uncontested or ex-parte 
matters, shall be accompanied by a, memorandum 
of points and authorities . . . . Memoranda 
supporting or opposing a motion shall not 
exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the 
"statement of material facts" as provided in 
paragraph (2), except as waived by order of 
the court on ex-parte application. . . . 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. 
The responding party shall file and serve 
upon all parties within ten days after 
service of a motion, a. memorandum in 
opposition to the motion, and all supporting 
documentation. 
(c) Reply memorandum. The moving party 
may serve and file a reply memorandum within 
five days after service of the responding 
party's memorandum. 
Utah Code Jud. Admin. R4-501(l)(a)-(c) (emphasis added)'. 
In interpreting a statute or rule, we examine its "%plain 
language and resort to other methods . . . only if the language 
is ambiguous.'" Stucker v. Summit County, 870 P.2d 283, 287 
(Utah App.) (quoting State v. Masciantonio, 850 P.2d 492, 493 
(Utah App. 1993)), cert, denied. 879 P.2d 266 (Utah 1994). Here, 
it is clear that the plural "memoranda" which appears in the rule 
and on which Hartford relies, refers to all memoranda received by 
the court—from all parties that either oppose or support any 
motion-*and does not mean that each party may submit more than 
one memorandum. We agree with the State's contention that the 
ten-page limit imposed by Rule 4-501(1)(a) would be completely 
ineffective if a party could freely file supplemental memoranda. 
Subsection (a) and subsection (b) explicitly provide for only a 
single memorandum to be filed in support of or opposition to a 
particular motion. Indeed, the only additional memorandum 
allowed is the reply memorandum provided for by subsection (c), 
but that option is limited to the moving party. In the case at 
hand, Hartford is the non-moving party. 
Furthermore, "[a] trial judge is accorded broad discretion 
in determining how a [case] shall proceed in his or her 
courtroom." University of Utah v. Industrial Comm'n, 736 P.2d 
630, 633 (Utah 1987)• Accordingly, the trial court in this case 
was well within its discretion in refusing to accept a 
supplemental memorandum that was submitted without prior 
invitation and outside the bounds of duly promulgated procedural 
rules.9 
CONCLUSION 
Given the totality of circumstances, the trial court abused 
its discretion in granting the state's Motion to Dismiss for Lack 
of Prosecution. However, the trial court did not err in refusing 
to accept Hartford's supplemental memorandum in opposition to 
this motion. We reverse and remand to the trial court for such 
further proceedings as may now be appropriate. 
GregorirK. Orme, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
I CONCUR: 
?* %yZimmm*t*m £ ^ 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
9. Nothing prevents the trial court from receiving additional 
memoranda if it wishes to do so. We merely hold that Hartford 
was not entitled to submit the additional memorandum as a matter 
of right. Hartford may have been more successful in gaining 
acceptance of its supplemental memorandum if it had first sought 
leave of court. Counsel could have filed a motion, stating the 
reasons the information was not included in the original 
memorandum, and requested permission to submit an additional 
memorandum. ££• Utah R. Civ. P. 15(d) (motion to allow 
supplemental pleadings, at discretion of court); Utah R. Civ. P. 
60(b)(1), (2) (motion for relief from judgment for excusable 
neglect or newly discovered evidence); Utah Code Jud. Admin. 
R4-501(l)(a) (over-length memorandum may be submitted with prior 
leave of court on ex parte application)• 
930612-CA 12 
DAVIS, Judge (concurring in the result): 
I concur in the result reached by the court because the 
mandatory language of Rule 4-506 makes notification of the 
unrepresented party an express precondition to initiation of 
further proceedings against that party. The rule mandates notice 
prior to initiation of further proceedings, and the proceedings 
may be held twenty days after the date of filing the notice. The 
rule does not require a twenty-day waiting period between the 
filing of the notice and initiation of further proceedings. 
Thus, under the terms of the rule, the State could have filed the 
notice required under Rule 4-506 immediately prior to its March 
26, 1993 motion to dismiss; and, under the rule, the court would 
not be in a position to hold proceedings on the motion until 
twenty days after the filing of the notice—on or about April 15, 
1993. On April 12, 1993, and June 8, 1993, plaintiff filed 
responsive pleadings, and the court made rulings on June 21, July 
15, and July 19, 1993, all approximately ninety days after the 
State filed its motion to dismiss without having first given 
notice as required by Rule 4-506. 
But for the mandatory language contained in Rule 4-506, I 
believe the trial court's analysis of this issue would have been 
entirely correct, as any purpose to be served by the provisions 
of Rule 4-506 was served by the lapse of time between the 
initiation of proceedings by the State and the conduct of those 
proceedings by the court. For the foregoing reasons, I also 
disagree with the court's analysis that plaintiff suffered some 
sort of injustice as a result of the State's failure to perform 
an act that, under the facts of this case, was hardly more than 
ministerial. The record does not suggest that plaintiff relied 
upon or in any way changed its position in reliance on the 
State's failure to file notice under the rule or that had 
plaintiff reactivated the case in response to a Rule 4-506 
notice, any of the dismissal factors set out on pages 4-5 of the 
court's opinion would have been resolved in plaintiff's favor. 
While the State may have been remiss in failing to comply with 
the provisions of Rule 4-506, it can hardly be suggested that the 
motion to dismiss did not let plaintiff know that the State was 
tirecK^f waiting and plaintiff was, in fact, spurred to action. 
ADDENDUM 5 
Hartford Leasing Information (R.235) 
HARTFORD LEASING INFORMATION OBTAINED BY 
DISCOVERY AND OTHER EFFORTS 
ZN FURTHERANCE OF PROSECUTING THE CASE 
DATE Nature of Item 
4/20/84 State's offer for bids 
5/1/84 Hartford Leasing's proposal in response to bid 
8/27/84 Department of Administrative Services, Division of 
Facilities Construction & Management, Management 
Information Systems leased facility Report 
9/24/84 Facilities Construction & management information 
systems Data Entry Worksheet 
11/1/84 State signs lease with Hartford 
5/22/85 Hartford entered Lease with State 
5/22/85 State amends lease with hartford 
4/14/86 William Lund, Site Investigation Section, State of 
Utah Natural Resources, letter to James Adamson, 
Southeastern Utah Health District copying report on 
Moab gas leak prepared by William Case, geologist 
6/?/86 EPA report on effects of gasoline in drinking water 
11/19/86 Utah Geological and Mineral Survey letter to Ray 
Klepzig, La Sal, concerning above agency's report 
on water level data 
11/19/86 EarthFax Engineering, Inc. letter to raymond 
Klepzig, La Sal Oil report concerning gas leak 
12/1/86 McVey, Utah Industrial Commission, letter to 
Adamson, S.E. Ut. Health District, concerning 
results of bore samples performed 11/7/86 
12/7/86 Environmental Response Team for the Department of 
Health issues "Soil Gas Survey of Leaking 
Underground Storage Tanks in Moab, Utah" 
1/7/87 Guidance for Indoor Air Quality Investigations 
prepared by the Rocky Mountain Center for 
Occupational and Environmental Health 
1/7/87 Enviresponse, Inc. issues "Oil Fingerprint and 
Gasoline Quantification for Water Samples, Moab Utah" 
2/3/87 Memo from C. jay Silvernale, RCRA Compliance 
Monitoring Hydrologist to Mike Holmes, EPA, 
* / s 
Judicial Administration 
1/30/89 
5/1/89 
5/9/89 
6/21/89 
6/30/89 
7/12/89 
7/26/89 
8/1/89 
9/9/89 
12/5/89 
12/6/89 
12/21/89 
12/26/89 
1/22/90 
3/2/90 
Gardiner letter to Speciale turning over materials 
and requesting payment for materials received from 
the EPA 
Hartford Leasing receives Proposal and Contract 
from E & G Contractors of Pocatello, Idaho to make 
corrections to the building 
unsigned document from whomever was representing 
Hartford concerning arrears and potential 
settlement of this matter 
Speciale letter to Bachman concerning negotiations 
to reenter the building 
Bachman letter to Speciale concerning negotiations 
for State to reenter builfrtrrg _ 
Speciale letter to Applegate-- concerning 
negotiations with State over reoccupying the 
building 
Suitter, Axland submitted Preliminary Assessment 
report prepared by State of Utah, Department of 
Health, Division of Environmental Health, to George 
Speciale 
Hartford Leasing meeting with State and Insurance 
companies 
Deposition of jack Quintana taken 
Bachman letter to Speciale concerning negotiations 
between State and Hartford Leasing about State 
reentering the building 
Speciale Letter to Applegate concerning 
negotiations with State to reenter building 
Traveler's Letter to Speciale concerning dismissing 
Dependable Janitorial Service from the lawsuit. 
Speciale letter to Applegate concerning 
negotiations with State over reoccupying the 
building 
Bachman letter to Speciale negotiating the 
conditions which must be met for the State to 
reenter the building 
Bachman letter to Speciale concerning purchase of 
building 
ADDENDUM 6 
Copy of 6/21/89 Letter from Speciale to Bachman 
Law Office of 
GEORGE H. SPECIALE 
SUITE taoo 
610 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
•ALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84101 
11 r» * r\ ** f* 
TELEPHONE €801)560-0816 ^ ' * * -* - -~Cw 
TELECOPIER 1801) 860-0860 
June 21, 1989 
Alan Bachman 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
RE: Moab Regional Center/Hartford Leasing Corporation 
Dear Alan, 
Following the meeting between yourself representing the State; 
Jack D. Quintana and Joyce Milne of the Division of Facilities 
Construction and Management; LeRoy S. Axland (briefly) attorney for 
LaSalle Oil Company, Inc.; H. James Clegg attorney for Rio Vista Oil 
Ltd.; and myself as attorney for Hartford, you suggested that my 
client present a proposal for resolution of the continuing default of 
the State under its Lease Agreement for the building commomy 
referred to as the Moab Regional Center. 
Also present were advocates of "the Toxigon™ System", 
described as "in situ biochemical/biological treatment systems for 
elimination of organic contaminates from soil or water" consisting of 
two consultants and a contractor. 
In preparing to write this letter, I have reviewed a number of 
documents, including the deposition of Jack Quintana, the Delta 
Environmental Consultant's Report, the Lease Agreement, and the 
study conducted by the Rocky Mountain Center for Occupational and 
Environmental Health of the University of Utah, for for the Division 
of Facilities Construction and Management. 
As you know, I organized the meeting for expressly the 
purpose of seeking resolution of the continuing refusal of the State to 
honor its obligations under the Lease, and I was disappointed that 
the State had nothing to offer by way of resolution except the excuse 
that its refusal to occupy the building is the result principally of a 
sinjle State employee who is, if I recall the language exactly, "kinda 
hysterical." 
The consultants, who had everything to gain by undertaking 
treatment or elimination of the supposed gasoline flume under the 
building, concluded that the studies of the building which they 
reviewed indicated virtually undetectable levels of hydrocarbons. 
The study performed by the Rocky Mountain Center for 
Occupational and Environmental Health represents a study in 
indecision as to why employees might have health complaints. 
Perhaps the most telling recommendation is the suggestion that the 
owner erect "a status board mounted in the hallway with lights to 
demonstrate fan operation and fresh air damper position." 
Other recommendations relate to modifications to the building 
itself which, it should be noted, was built strictly to specifications 
provided by the DFCM. 
In short, the State's complaint is «ut that the premises have 
been damaged in such a way as to make the building untenable, but 
that a panic has grown up among its employees which it lacks the 
ability to remedy. I find it incredible that the State is itself 
eminently satisfied with the building and desires a solution which 
would enable it to reoccupy the premises, but has not resolved what 
appears to be its own personnel problems. 
My client does not wish to further litigate this matter since the 
actions of the State have already resulted in Hartford's seeking relief 
under the Bankruptcy Code. 
Hartford is eager to render whatever assistance it can in order 
to satisfy the needs of the State. In that regard, you will find a 
proposal and contract submitted by the contractors with whom we 
met, proposing remedies at a relatively economical cost. You will 
note that the proposal includes some of the recommendations of the 
study performed by the State, and also includes new aspects which 
would enhance resolution of the problem of the plume. 
This remedy is, of course, in addition to efforts previously 
undertaken by Hartford, including the removal of all carpeting, 
treatment or all floors with fungicide on two or three occasions, 
p-ofessional evaluation, adjustment and modification of the HVAC 
system, tfno'eTevatioii 01 theTsewef veniK. i^ioTjOa^siso.offered 
in the past to undertake all ofjthe remedies suggested in Ihe_=^ tijdy 
contracted for by the atate, but the State declined saying those 
tiibrts wouia not De adequate! 
Since the State, while acknowledging that all tests indicate 
levels of toxicity which are below EPA guidelines, but has been 
unwilling or unable to suggest a means by which its agencies would 
reoccupy the premises, we propose the following: 
1. The proposal and contract offered by £ & G Contractors, Inc. 
be immediately executed and the work commenced forthwith. 
2. The State assume payment of the cost to £ & G Contractors, 
Inc. of the proposed remediation. In that regard, I will again note 
that the attorney for LaSalle Oil Company offered $5,000.00 as a 
contribution when I first discussed with him the bio remediation 
method. I have no doubt that Rio Vista Oil would similarly be willing 
to participate in that cost. 
3. The State would forthwith pay the lease payment of 
$67,920.00 which was due in June of 1988 and either commence 
monthly payments of the lease installments due beginning in 'June or 
1989; or pay the total sum less the discount, all as is provided by the 
lease. 
4. The State and Hartford would share the cost of recarpeting, 
as required. 
This proposal should not be seen as a one-sided demand 
against the State. Hartford has suffered and continues to suffer 
considerably resulting from the default under the lease for acts of 
third parties, and the proposal I have set forth describes minimally 
satisfaction of damages which have accrued to Hartford, in the hope 
that the problem can be resolved. 
Continued delay operates to the disadvantage of both the State 
and Hartford and, accordingly, I request that you respond to this 
letter within ten (10) days. While I do not expect, realistically, that 
outright acceptance of this proposal will be had within that time, I 
expect, at the least, an indication that the State is undertaking 
appropriate consideration of the matter to be communicated to me. 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
. Speciale 
GHS/tp 
Enclosure 
cc: Hartford Leasing 
ADDENDUM 7 
Copies of Mr. Specialefs letters dated June 30, 1989, December 5, 
1989 and September 10, 1990 
OFFICE OF 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF UTAH 
**J~ Cj3cfel 
R. PAUL VAN DAM - ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 STATE CAPITOL • SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114 • TELEPHONE 801 538-1015 • FAX NO 801 538 1121 
JOSEPH E. TESCH 
CHIEF DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
DAVID V. THOMAS 
CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR 
June 30, 1989 
George H. Speciale, Esq. 
Suite 1309 
310 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: 
Dear George: 
Moab Regional Center/Hartford Leasing Corportaion 
I have reviewed your letter and proposal of June 21, 
1989 as well as discussed it with Jack Quintana of DFCM. 
Your letter greatly mischaracterizes the Staters 
position in regard to the subject building. Nevertheless, we are 
working on possible solutions for the problems. 
I plan on getting back to you shortly with a response 
from DFCM to your proposal as well as any counterproposals. 
Please note that this letter and all the communications 
in our meetings are for pxirposes of settlement only and are not 
admissible in litigation. 
Sincerely, 
tfLJSJL— 
ALAN S. BACHMAN 
As sitant Attorney General 
ASB/dp 
cc: Jack Quintana, DFCM 
OFFICE OF 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF UTAH 
R. PAUL VAN DAM - ATT<*M\ CCNERAI 
2*6 STATE CAPITOL • SALT LAKE Cm\UTAH «4114 • TELEPHONE tOl SU 1015 • FAX NO f01538 1121 
JOSEPH E. TESCH 
CHIEF DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
December 5, 1989 
George H. Speciale, Esq. 
Suite 1309 
310 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
SENT CERTIFIED KAIL 
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED 
Re: 
Dear George: 
Moab Regional Center/Hartford Leasing Corporation 
Staff from the Division of Facilities Construction and 
Management (DFCM) and myself have met on several occasions with 
representatives of the employees that previously occupied the 
subject facility in Moab, Utah* 
I have attached as Exhibit "A" hereto for your 
necessary attention all of the conditions that would need to be 
met before the employees would be willing to reoccupy the 
facility- These conditions are based upon the most recent data 
concerning the plume and the condition of the building. 
We would like to meet with you to discuss this matter 
in detail. An agreement needs to be reached prior to February 1, 
1990, if we are to participate in any re-entry. 
The purpose of this letter and attachment is for 
purposes of settlement only. Thanks for your cooperation. 
Sincerely, 
ASB/dp 
ALAN ^5". BACHMAN 
Assistant Attorney General 
cc: Neal P. Stowe, Director, DFCM 
Jack Quintana, Assistant Director, DFCM 
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R. PAUL VAN DAM - ATTORNFYGFNFRAI 
236 STATE CAPITOL • SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH §4114 • TELEPHONE. SQ1-SI8-101S • 
JOSEPH E. TESCH 
CHIEF Of PUTV ATTORNEY GENERAL 
€©FY 
September 10, 1990 
George H. Speciale, Esq. CONFIDENTIAL/Purchase offer 
Suite 1309 
310 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
84101 
Ret MOAB REGIONAL CENTER/OFFER TO PURCHASE 
As you know, the State had asked an independent MAI fee 
appraiser to prepare an appraisal of the subject property of the 
Hartford Leasing Corporation lawsuit. Please find attached a 
copy of that appraisal report dated June 19, 1990, by William R. 
Lang, MAI and Brett A. Smith. That appraisal report and this 
letter is provided to you for purposes of settlement of this 
matter only. The statements in the appraisal report are not 
necessarily the position of the State of Utah in regard to the 
condition of the building or causes of the evacuation of the 
building by the State. 
Nevertheless, for purposes of settlement of this matter 
only, my client is willing to offer to purchase the subject 
property for the market value stated in the report ($155,000.00) 
less the costs of restoring the building to a condition for safe 
re-occupation (an estimated $30,000.00). This offer is subject 
to approval by the Utah State Legislature. A stipulated 
dismissal with prejudice from the subject lawsuit would also be 
required. 
We request your immediate authorization to allow an 
architect, hired by the State, to enter the premises for purposes 
of evaluating the internal design for the possible re-entry. 
The State may also be interested in purchasing 
additional property for expansion of the facility. 
OFFICE OF 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF UTAH 
George H. Speciale, Esq. 
September 10, 1990 
Page Two 
Please call me in regard to this letter. A meeting can 
be arranged as soon as possible, if you so desire. It is our 
intent to have a resolution of this "purchase" possibility by 
October 1, 1990, subject only to legislative approval. 
Sincerely, 
ALAN S. BACHMAN 
Assistant Attorney General 
ASB/dp 
cc: Neal P. Stowe, Director, DFCM 
Ken Nye, DFCM 
Jack Quintana, DFCM 
Warren K. Grames, Risk Management 
ATTACHMENT: LANG APPRAISAL 
